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Allen: Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in North Carolina

COMMENTS

UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT IN
NORTH CAROLINA
I.

INTRODUCTION

Each year over 100,000 children are the victims of childsnatching.1 Child-snatching is an unfortunate scenario in which
one parent grabs his or her child and tries to win custody elsewhere or goes underground with the child.' In one out of every
twenty-two divorces, a child will be snatched by a non-custodial
parent. The majority of those children taken are between the ages
of three and five.3 An atmosphere of "seize and run" has developed
over the years in child custody disputes in the United States because of the reluctance both of courts and of law enforcement officers to interfere in family squabbles." The old adage "possession
is nine parts of the law" has never been so clearly evident as it has
been in the area of child custody disputes.0 More often than not,
the parent with physical possession of the child has been granted
custody no matter what the circumstances under which possession
was obtained.
In a child custody dispute, both the parents and the children
suffer emotional upheaval. The real "victims,"however, are the
children. The children undergo severe, often irreversible psychological harm when they live in an atmosphere in which they are
constantly being "snatched" back and forth between parents who
travel to different states seeking custody. 6 The environment in
which the children live is unstable at best, and perhaps compara1. Pick, Kidnapped, 9 STUDENT LAWYER 28 (1980).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 30.
4. Foster and Freed, A Legislative Beginning to Child-Snatching Prevention, 17 TRiM. 36 (1981). Justice Jackson once referred to the law relating to child
custody as the law of "seize and run."
5. Id. "Until recently, possession of the child was nine parts of the law."
6. Pick, supra note 1, at 28.
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ble to life in a POW or concentration camp at worst.'
Public concern for the plight of children caught up in custody
battles has received extensive media coverage in the last few
years. 8 Psychologists have stressed the need for stability and continuity in the life of a young child already affected by divorce. 9 In
1968, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) was
formulated in an effort to put a stop to the on-going battles in
child custody cases.10 The Act serves a dual purpose: assuring the
child a more stable life and removing the incentive to snatch a
child to gain legal custody in a court of another state."
The UCCJA was adopted by North Carolina in July, 1979, and
is codified in Chapter 50A of the North Carolina General Statutes.'2 In the years since the adoption of the UCCJA in North Carolina, the courts have approached the problems of interstate child
custody disputes by reference to the goals and principles of the
UCCJA. This comment will examine the changes in North Carolina's judicial approach to custodial disputes since the adoption of
the UCCJA, the effect of the Act in North Carolina and the
problems which still remain to be resolved under the UCCJA.
II.

PRE-UCCJA

Before the passage of the UCCJA, the principle of self-help
predominated in child custody cases." One parent could easily find
a second state which would refuse to give recognition to a custody
decree of an out-of-state court and would modify the decree." A
number of factors contributed to confusion among courts. One of
the factors was that the state court was subject to no federal or
state law requiring full faith and credit to the custody decree of a
sister state.1 5 In order to protect the best interest of the child, the
7. Id. at 35.
8. Sampson, What's Wrong with the UCCJA, 3(4) FAm. ADVOCATE 28, 29
(1981).
9. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
CHILD 37-39 (1973).
10. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. Rv. 1207
(1969).

11. Id. at 1244.
12.
13.
14.
15.

N. C. GEN. STAT. § 50A (Supp. 1979).
Foster and Freed, supra note 4, at 36.
Katz, Legal Remedies to Child Snatching, 15 FAm. L.
Id.
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decree was modifiable in the state of origin and, therefore, was not
due full faith and credit. The United States Supreme Court affirmed this policy in New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey.'6 This
holding was bolstered by other court decisions.17 The cases indicated that the policy of protecting a child's welfare outweighed any
national policy of full faith and credit.' 8 These decisions helped
breed an atmosphere in which self-help was encouraged. Having
lost in the first round of custody battle, one need only go to a different state to obtain custody.
Another factor contributing to the widespread reliance on selfhelp was the United States Supreme Court decision in May v. Anderson,'9 which held that one not technically under the personal
jurisdiction of the court was not bound by its custody decree. If
one of the parents was not personally before the first court, he or
she could go to another state and have the decree modified. Justice
Jackson predicted the case would reduce the "law of custody to a
rule of seize-and-run. ' 0
Both of the above factors contributed little to the interests of
the child; instead they contributed to the interest of the losing parent.' While paying lip service to the policy of protecting the child,
the courts in reality were helping develop an atmosphere which
had devastating effects on the child.
An additional factor leading to the self-help atmosphere was
the lack of uniformity of decisions pertaining to child custody.2 2
The decisions were denounced by many as being no better than a
"quicksand foundation for analysis of jurisdiction. 2 3 Courts accepted jurisdiction over the child custody matter using a variety of
different tests: physical presence of the child in the state; the parents' consent to jurisdiction; and the child's domicile. 4 This broad
view of jurisdiction over custody matters often resulted in a number of states having concurrent jurisdiction.2 '5 The losing parent

merely took the child to another state where he or she could be
16. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962). Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958).
Bodenheimer, supra note 10, at 1211, n. 19.
345 U.S. 528 (1953).
Id. at 542 (Minton, J., dissenting).
Bodenheimer, supra note 10, at 1212.
22. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 42 (1968).
23. Id.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 585 (1971).
25. Bodenheimer, supra note 10, at 1214.
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granted custody of the child.
While it was easy for the losing parent to use self-help in the
pre-UCCJA climate, not all courts would accept jurisdiction. A
number of courts followed the "clean hands" doctrine and refused
to consider modification of an out-of-state decree in favor of one
who had violated the decree and had abducted the child.26 Other
courts refused to clash with the decisions of courts of other
states. 27 Some courts refused to hear cases if the child was not
physically before the court.2 8 These courts were composed of conscientious judges doing their best simultaneously to seek fairness
for all concerned and protect the child.
North Carolina's caselaw, prior to the adoption of the UCCJA,
was confused and unstable because of the attempt by courts to
make the welfare of the child the "polar star" in custody disputes.2 ' Unfortunately, this standard was not uniformly applied.
Each court either accepted or rejected jurisdiction on the basis of
what it considered was the best interest of the child. Some North
Carolina courts were willing to accept jurisdiction and modify an
out-of-state decree even if the child was not physically before the
court and had never been within the court's jurisdiction. 0 Other
courts took the position that if the child itself was in North Carolina, the court could determine custody, even if one or both parents were residents of other states.8 1 The focus of jurisdiction was
placed on the child and not the parents. Physical presence of the
child was sufficient basis for exercise of jurisdiction.3 2 The willingness of these courts to protect the child was not dampened by the
fact that the child and the parents were domiciled in another state,
so long as the child could be deemed a resident of North Caro26. Id. at 1215.
27. Id.
28. Crouch, Clearing the Court of Unneeded Custody Disputes, 3(2)
ADVOCATE

FAM.

6 at 8 (1980).

29. Wilson v. Wilson, 269 N.C. 676, 153 S.E.2d 349 (1967); Holmes v. Sanders, 246 N.C. 200, 97 S.E.2d 683 (1957); Gafford v. Phelps, 235 N.C. 218, 69 S.E.2d
313 (1952).
30. Speck v. Speck, 5 N.C. App. 296, 168 S.E.2d 672 (1969). The "child" was
a thirty-four year old mentally and physically disabled male. The court held that
the presumption that a child at twenty-one was capable of self-support was rebuttable. In this case, the child's permanent brain damage and poor physical health
required continued support past the age of twenty-one.
31. In re Orr; 254 N.C. 723, 119 S.E.2d 880 (1961).
32. In re Kluttz, 7 N.C. App. 383, 172 S.E.2d 95 (1970).
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lina. s In contrast, some North Carolina courts refused to exercise
jurisdiction if the child was not within the court's jurisdiction."
Other courts were hesitant to exercise jurisdiction if the only basis
was that the child was domiciled in North Carolina. The courts
were careful to find a substantial change in circumstances since the
35
decree was issued and that it was best to change custodians.
If the court was asked to modify a custody decree, a number of
North Carolina courts were willing to do so even if another state
had granted custody of the child to another person. If the claimant
could prove the existence of changed circumstances, courts were
willing to modify a decree if such action was considered necessary
for the best interest of the child. 6 On the other hand, a number of
courts were willing to give full faith and credit to sister state custody decrees and would not accept jurisdiction if another state already had.37 Some of the courts stressed that full faith and credit
was due only if the court found that the other court had jurisdiction and it was in the best interest of the child."
III. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT

In July, 1979, North Carolina joined the other states which
have adopted the UCCJA in some form. Only Massachusetts, New
Mexico and South Carolina have refused to adopt the Act, but the
Act will govern the return of children to these states.8 9
The UCCJA embodies the principles of comity, continuing jurisdiction and forum non conveniens in an effort to stop forum
shopping in child custody disputes. It is designed to "prevent the
desperate shifting from one state to another of thousands of innocent children ....

0
,,
Under the UCCJA, only one state will have

primary responsibility for a custody case. A second court will intervene only in specific circumstances. Once a court has decided an
33. Holmes v. Sanders, 246 N.C. 200, 97 S.E.2d 683 (1957).
34. Coble v. Coble, 229 N.C. 81, 47 S.E.2d 798 (1948).
35. Richter v. Harmon, 243 N.C. 373, 90 S.E.2d 744 (1956).
36. Spence v. Durham, 283 N.C. 671, 198 S.E.2d 537 (1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 918 (1974).
37. Searl v. Searl, 34 N. C. App. 583, 239 S.E.2d 305 (1977); Taylor v. Taylor,
20 N.C. App. 188, 201 S.E.2d 43 (1973).
38. In re Kluttz, 7 N.C. App. 383, 172 S.E.2d 95 (1970). See also Matthews v.
Matthews, 24 N.C. App. 551, 211 S.E.2d 513 (1975); Swanson v. Swanson, 22 N.C.
App. 152, 205 S.E.2d 738 (1974).
39. Crouch, supra note 28, at 6.
40. Fry v. Ball, 190 CoL 128, 544 P.2d 402, 405 (1975).
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issue as provided by the UCCJA, all courts in states which have
adopted the UCCJA must recognize and enforce the decision."'
The UCCJA marks a shift in the emphasis of policy in the
area of child custody. The focus is no longer on what law a court
should apply in resolving a custody dispute; instead the focus is on
which court is best able to make the decision.42 The state with the
maximum contact with the child will be the one to determine the
case. 48 This change indicates the UCCJA is definitely child-centered rather than parent-centered.
The UCCJA was enacted to plug three major loopholes in
prior child custody law. It eliminates jurisdiction based on physical
presence of the child alone; it prohibits modification of custody decrees with limited exceptions; and it requires enforcement of outof-state decrees. 4 These loopholes were the major incentives for
child-snatchers who sought a "better deal" in another state.
The purposes of the Act are: to avoid jurisdictional competition among the courts; to promote cooperation with courts of other
states; to assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child
takes place in the state with the closest connection with the child;
to discourage continuing controversies over child custody; to deter
abductions and unilateral removal of children; to avoid re-litigation of custody decisions; to promote and expand the exchange of
information among the courts of the various states and provide for
uniformity of law. 4 5 A court is to approach each custody decision
41. S.
CHILDREN

KATZ,

CmLD

SNATCHING: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE ABDUCTION OF

25 (1981).

42. Id. at 83.
43. Id. at 16.
44. Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing
Jurisdiction under the UCCJA, 14 Fm. L. Q. 203 at 204 (1981).
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50A-1 (Supp. 1979):
(a) The general purposes of this Chapter are to:

(1) Avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other
states in matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the
shifting of children from state to state with harmful effects on their wellbeing;
(2) Promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end
that a custody decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the
case in the interest of the child;
(3) Assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child takes
place ordinarily in the state with which the child and the child's family
have the closest connection and where significant evidence concerning
the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships is most
readily available, and that courts of this State decline the exercise of ju-
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with these purposes in mind and strive to render a decision which
will further these goals.
Multiple and concurrent jurisdiction, which leads to a tug of
war between state courts, has been replaced with strictly limited
jurisdiction. A North Carolina court has initial jurisdiction to make
a custody award in the following circumstances. 46 Initial jurisdiction is primarily vested in the "home state" of the child. The
"home state" is that state in which the child, immediately preceding the time involved, lived with a parent at least six consecutive
months. If the child is less than six months old, the home state is
the state where the child has lived since birth with any of the persons involved in the suit.47 North Carolina would also be deemed
the "home state" if it was the child's home state within six months
before the proceeding and the child is absent from North Carolina
because of removal by another claiming custody and the parent or
person acting as parent continues to live in North Carolina.48 This
risdiction when the child and the child's family have a closer connection
with another state.

(4) Discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the interest of greater stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the child;
(5) Deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody awards;
(6) Avoid re-litigation of custody decisions of other states in this
State insofar as feasible;
(7) Facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states;
(8) Promote and expand the exchange of information and other
forms of mutual assistance between the courts of this State and those of
other states concerned with the same child; and
(9) Make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
46. BLACKWELL, FAMWi
LAW HANDBOOK FOR NORTH CAROuNA-1980 § 5
(1980).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50A-2(5) (Supp. 1979).
"Home state" means the state in which the child immediately preceding
the time involved lived with the child's parents, parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months, and in the case of a
child less than six months old, the state in which the child lived from
birth with any of the persons mentioned. Periods of temporary absence
of any of the named persons are counted as part of the six-month or
other period[.]
48. Id. at § 50A-3(a)(1).
A court of this State authorized to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree if:
(1) This State ...

had been the child's home state within six
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provision is necessary to protect victims of child-snatching.

Initial jurisdiction is also met if the child and parents or the
child and one parent have "significant connections" with North
Carolina and if there is substantial evidence relevant to the child's
protection, care, training and personal relationships in North Carolina.49 North Carolina would obtain initial jurisdiction because it is
in the best position to gather the needed information to make an
informed decision concerning the child even if it does not technically qualify as the "home state." This provision must be interpreted strictly. The purposes of the Act limit jurisdiction. The
court must exercise jurisdiction on this basis only in the child's
best interest, rather than in the interests and convenience of the
parties.5 0 A state should accept jurisdiction under this provision
only if it has the maximum contact possible with the child.
These two bases of jurisdiction are designed to insure that the
court issuing a custody decree is the one best able to determine the
needs of the child. A "home state" or closely connected state is in a
far better position to make such a determination than a state
which by chance was the one to which the parent chose to flee.
A third basis for jurisdiction is emergency jurisdiction."' Jurisdiction can be obtained if the child is physically present in North
Carolina and has been abandoned or there is an emergency in
months before commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent
from this state because of the child's removal or retention by a person
claiming the child's custody or for other reasons, and a parent or person
acting as parent continues to live in this State[.]
49. Id. at § 50A-3(a)(2).
A court of this State authorized to decide custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree if: . . . (2) It is in the best interest of the child that a court of this

State assume jurisdiction because (i) the child and the child's parents, or
the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with
this State, and (ii) there is available in this State substantial evidence
relevant to the child's present or future care, protection, training, and
personal relationships[.]
50. Bates and Holmes, The Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionalAct: Progress and Pitfalls, 17 GA. ST. B. J. 72, 74 (1980).
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50A-3(a)(3) (Supp. 1979).
A court of this State authorized to decide custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree if:. . . (3) The child is physically present in this State and (i) the
child has been abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child has been subjected to or threatened with
mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected or dependent[.]
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss2/4
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which the child needs protection because he has been subjected to
or is threatened with harm. This basis should be used only in extraordinary circumstances and only for temporary orders pending
action by a state with the requisite jurisdiction. 2 This provision
embodies the parens patriae doctrine which enables a state to take
measures concerning the protection of a child within its borders."
A charge of mistreatment of a child is deemed justification to intrude in the judicial proceedings of another state. This emergency
doctrine is the only exception to the mandate that physical presence of the child alone is not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction."
Physical presence is usually insufficient because the Act limits jurisdiction to the courts with maximum access to the facts. 5
The fourth basis for initial jurisdiction is the catch-all provision." Jurisdiction exists if no other state has jurisdiction under
the other three bases or if another state has declined jurisdiction
on the basis that North Carolina is the more appropriate forum.
Jurisdiction must be declined if at the time of filing of the
action for custody in North Carolina a proceeding concerning custody was pending in a court of another state exercising jurisdiction
in conformity with the UCCJA. 57 This refusal to exercise jurisdiction is mandatory unless the other court stays its own proceedings
52. Bodenheimer, supra note 10, at 1229.
53. Id. at 1229.
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50A-3(b) (Supp. 1979).
Except under paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a), physical presence
in this State of the child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is
not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this State to make
a child custody determination.
55. Bodenheimer, supra note 10, at 1227.
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50A-3(a)(4) (Supp. 1979).
A court of this state authorized to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification
decree if: . . . (4) (i) It appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in accordance with paragraphs (1),
(2), or (3), or another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the
ground that this State is the more appropriate forum to determine the
custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that
this court assume jurisdiction.
57. Id. at § 50A-6(a). If at the time of filing the petition a proceeding
concerning the custody of the child was pending in a court of another
state exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this Chapter, a court of this State shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this
Chapter, unless the proceeding is stayed by the court of the other state
because this State is a more appropriate forum or for other reasons.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1982

9

380-

Campbell
Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 4
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:371

because North Carolina is a more appropriate forum.5" This provision is designed to assure cooperation among the state courts and
reduce the amount of judicial competition. The court does have
the power to determine if the other court is in conformity with the
UCCJA.59
A court may decline jurisdiction if it determines it is an inconvenient forum and another state is a more appropriate forum.6 0
This rule sets out the various factors to be considered in determining if North Carolina is an inconvenient forum under the circume Ideally, the court
stances of the individual case.Y
will use judicial
restraint and choose not to exercise jurisdiction if another state is
in a better position to determine custody. " '
Jurisdiction may also be declined if the plaintiff seeking an
initial decree has wrongfully taken the child from another state or
has committed some other reprehensible act making it just and
proper to decline jurisdiction." This provision embodies the "clean
hands" doctrine. The incentive to child-snatch will be lessened if
the child-snatcher finds the courthouse door closed because he/she
has "unclean" hands. The provision will deter child-snatchers,
however, only if the courts stand behind the Act and refuse to accept jurisdiction."
58. Id.
59. Davis v. Davis, 53 N.C. App. 531, 281 S.E.2d 411 (1981).
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50A-7 (Supp. 1979).
61. Id. at (c). In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court
shall consider if it is in the interest of the child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this purpose it may take into account the following factors, among others:
(1) If another state is or recently was the child's home state;
(2) If another state has a closer connection with the child and the child's
family or with the child and one or more of the contestants;
(3) If substantial evidence relevant to the child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal relationships is more readily available
in another state;
(4) If the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less appropriate; and
(5) If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this State would contravene any of the purposes in G.S. 50A-1.
62. Bodenheimer, supra note 10, at 1231.
63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50A-8. "(a) If the petitioner for an initial decree has
wrongfully taken the child from another state or has engaged in similar reprehensible conduct the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction if this is just and
proper under the circumstances."
64. Bodenheimer, supra note 44, at 210.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss2/4
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The only court with jurisdiction to modify an existing custody
decree is the court which rendered it."" No other state has the
power to modify the decree and must recognize the continuing jurisdiction (which is exclusive) of the prior state unless that state
declines to exercise its modification jurisdiction or all the parties
and the child have left the state." Only the state of continuing
jurisdiction has the power to modify and it alone can decide
whether or not to exercise jurisdiction. 7
The aforementioned rules are supplemented by provisions for
the imposition of costs, notice to parties and other rules for communication and assistance among courts of different states. In
sum, the Act is designed to eliminate the incentive to child-snatch
with a common sense approach to the problems and to shift the
focus of the attention to the real party in interest-the child.68

IV.

APPLICATION OF THE

UCCJA IN NORTH CAROLINA

Since the adoption of the UCCJA in North Carolina, the approach of the courts to child custody disputes has been modified.
Instead of automatically exercising jurisdiction, the courts have expressed a willingness to use the principles and rules set out in the
UCCJA. The UCCJA has fostered a new attitude toward exercise
of jurisdiction. The courts have been forced to learn to accommodate the difference between a lack of jurisdiction and the non-exercise of jurisdiction."9 While the court may technically have jurisdiction over the parties, it must refuse to exercise the jurisdiction if
the child is before the court as a result of kidnapping or wrongful
retention in the state.
The cases which have been decided since the adoption of theUCCJA in North Carolina indicate the willingness of North Carolina courts to follow the UCCJA principles. As long as another
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50A-14(a). If a court of another state has made a
custody decree, a court of this State shall not modify that decree unless
(1) it appears to the court of this State that the court which rendered the
decree does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites
substantially in accordance with this Chapter or has declined to assume
jurisdiction to modify the decree and (2) the court of this State has
jurisdiction.
66. Bodenheimer, supra note 10, at 1236.
67. Bodenheimer, supra note 44, at 216.
68. Bates and Holmes, supra note 50, at 78.
69. Cole, Child Stealing: When to Tell A Judge not to Exercise Jurisdiction,
3(2) FAM. ADVOCATE 10 (1978).
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state does not have pending litigation over the custody matter,
North Carolina courts are still willing to exercise jurisdiction. In
McAninch v. McAninch,7" for example, the Court exercised jurisdiction over a custody matter when the facts showed that Florida
had not conducted any hearing on the custody matter.
The exercise of emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJA has
been restrained. Only in the case of a genuine emergency has the
court been willing to hear a case. In King v. Demo,71 the Court
modified an earlier Colorado decree when both the child and the
father were in North Carolina and an emergency existed which
threatened the child.
Before a court will be allowed to modify a decree, the court
must find that such action is in the best interest of the child and
some change of circumstances exists to warrant the modification.
7 the trial court had
In Williams v. Richardson,
modified a decree
without specifically finding that such a modification was in the
best interest of the child. Virginia had awarded custody of the children to the mother with visitation rights for the father. The
mother, children and second husband moved to North Carolina.
The father was later successful in having custody granted to him
because the Virginia court held the mother in contempt for denial
of visitation rights. The father then moved to Georgia with the
children. The mother sought to obtain custody of the children in
North Carolina after she had gone to Georgia and kidnapped one
of the children. The North Carolina trial court gave temporary and
later permanent custody to the mother on the basis that such action was best for the children. The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that while the trial court technically did have jurisdiction to modify because Virginia's jurisdiction had ended under the
UCCJA when all the parties moved out of state, it was in error
when it accepted jurisdiction because the record failed to show it
was in the best interest of the children. 3 Under the principles of
the UCCJA, the court must be certain its exercise of jurisdiction is
supported by the facts.
When presented with a request to modify a decree issued by
another state, the courts have been reluctant to exercise jurisdic70. 39 N.C. App. 665, 251 S.E.2d 633, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 300, 254 S.E.2d
920 (1979).
71. 40 N.C. App. 661, 253 S.E.2d 616 (1979).
72. 53 N.C. App. 663, 281 S.E.2d 777 (1981).
73. Id.
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tion and normally accord full faith and credit to an out-of-state
decree unless the plaintiff can present convincing evidence of a
true need to modify. In Robertson v. Smith,"' the Court refused to
modify a prior Texas decree and held full faith and credit must be
given to the decree. In Lynch v. Lynch,7" the Supreme Court of
North Carolina held the Appeals Court erred in denying full faith
and credit to an Illinois decree which had awarded custody to the
wife. The wife filed for divorce in Illinois in 1977. The husband left
Illinois with the child without the mother's consent and filed for
divorce and custody of the child one year later in North Carolina.
The mother counter-petitioned for divorce, temporary custody and
child support in Illinois. A North Carolina district court granted
temporary custody to the father in June 1978. Meanwhile, the Illinois court held the father in default for failure to answer the wife's
petition, granted the divorce and gave full custody to the mother
while ordering the father to return the child to Illinois. The mother
then asked the North Carolina court to dismiss the father's divorce
action and set aside its custody decree because of the Illinois decree. The North Carolina court dismissed the divorce action but
refused to give full faith to the Illinois custody decree. The Court
held that it was an error to deny full faith to the Illinois judgment
which was a permanent, final determination of custody by a court
with proper jurisdiction. Under the Illinois law a permanent custody order is final as to the circumstances existing at the time rendered. The Illinois court had shown no intent that the order was
temporary and retained jurisdiction over the matter. The district
court had no authority to modify the custody decree. Even though
the child was physically present in North Carolina, the father had
failed to present evidence that there was any reason for North Carolina to exercise its jurisdiction. He failed to prove the existence of
an emergency or that the child had been abandoned.
The North Carolina courts have shown a willingness to follow
the principles of the UCCJA. The focus has shifted from the parents to the child, and the courts decline to exercise jurisdiction if
another state has a closer connection with the family and the child
and has more readily available evidence. In Pope v. Jacobs,7 1 the
Court declined to exercise jurisdiction when it was determined that
Michigan was the home state and had a closer connection with the
74. 45 N.C. App. 535, 263 S.E.2d 36 (1980).
75. 303 N.C. 367, 274 S.E.2d 212 (1981).
76. 51 N.C. App. 374, 276 S.E.2d 487 (1981).
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child, even though the child was physically present in North Carolina. The Court followed the purposes of the UCCJA to avoid jurisdictional complications and promote cooperation among the states.
Michigan had been involved in the custody dispute since 1971 and
all the evidence concerning the care, training, and protection of the
child was in Michigan. In the best interest of the child Michigan
should resolve the matter instead of having the decision delayed by
North Carolina efforts to obtain needed information.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals decided to exercise jurisdiction in Davis v. Davis" even though another state had rendered a decree, because the Court felt that the other state had not
followed the principles of the UCCJA when it exercised jurisdiction. The Court stressed the importance of interpreting the
UCCJA to accomplish its purposes. 78 California had accepted jurisdiction and awarded custody to the mother even though she and
the children had only been in California for one month. The family
had lived in North Carolina for ten years, 1968-1978, prior to the
filing of the action and the children had lived in North Carolina
since the filing of the suit except for the period in which the
mother took them to California against the father's consent. California had exercised its jurisdiction, but the North Carolina court
was under a duty to examine the facts and determine if California
was exercising jurisdiction in conformity with the UCCJA. The
purposes of the UCCJA required the court to go beyond the dates
and residences and consider the childrens' history, best interest
and the conduct of the parents. 9 Upon consideration, the Court
decided that North Carolina was the "home state" of the children
and the most connected state; therefore, California should not
have exercised its jurisdiction. It was not the home state; it was not
closely connected nor was there substantial evidence to determine
what would be the best for the children in California; and the
mother's conduct indicated she had not dealt with the dispute
with"clean hands." Since the decree had been made under circumstances which were not in accord with the UCCJA, the North Carolina court was under no obligation to enforce it.
The courts have also applied the principles of the UCCJA to
decline jurisdiction in favor of a state which has not adopted the
UCCJA if the state was exercising jurisdiction under standards
77. 53 N.C. App. 531, 281 S.E.2d 411 (1981).
78. Id. at 413.
79. Id. at 411.
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which meet the principles of the UCCJA. Even though the UCCJA
is not reciprocal, in Nabors v. Farrell" the Court held that it was
error for the trial court to exercise jurisdiction over modification of
a custody decree when a petition for modification was pending in
Massachusetts, the state which had issued the original decree
(Massachusetts has not adopted the UCCJA).8s The factual circumstances indicated that Massachusetts was exercising jurisdiction in accord with the standards of the Act. Massachusetts had
significant connections with both the family and the child. Substantial evidence regarding the child's welfare was available in the
state, and it was in the best interest of the child for Massachusetts
to exercise jurisdiction. The trial court should have dismissed the
modification action for lack of jurisdiction."
North Carolina has indicated a willingness to follow the actions of other states which have used the UCCJA to stop childsnatching and has refused to become a party in a case of childsnatching. 83 Georgia in particular has applied the principles of the
UCCJA strictly and has warned parents that it will not be a sanctuary for child snatchers." Fewer parents will be inclined to resort
to self-help if they discover the court doors are closed to them in
other states.
V.

PROBLEMS WITH THE

UCCJA

While the UCCJA is definitely a step in the right direction to
preclude child-snatching, it is not without weaknesses. One of the
weaknesses is that the states have only partially and selectively
adopted the Act while it was designed to work as an integrated
whole. 85 The application of isolated sections of the Act may cause a
breakdown in the amount of cooperation and help between the dif80.
81.
82.
83.

53 N.C. App. 345, 280 S.E.2d 763 (1981).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50A-6(a), supra note 57.
Nabors v. Farrell, 53 N.C. App. 345, 280 S.E.2d 763 (1981).
Etzion v. Etzion, 247 Ga. 390, 276 S.E.2d 577 (1981). Georgia used the

clean hands doctrine and refused to allow its courts to be part of child-snatching.
Matthews v. Matthews, 238 Ga. 201, 232 S.E.2d 76 (1971). Georgia denied forum

to parent who had illegally seized child. Yearta v. Scoggins, 245 Ga. 831, 268
S.E.2d 151 (1980). Georgia refused to be forum to relitigate custody dispute unless legal custodian resided in the state. Bishop v. Bishop, 247 Ga. 56, 273 S.E.2d
394 (1981). Georgia refused to relitigate, confident that the first state would protect the child's interest.
84. Etzion v. Etzion, 247 Ga. 390, 276 S.E.2d 577, 578 (1981).
85. Crouch, supra note 28, at 10.
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ferent states. This weakness can be mitigated by stressing to state
legislatures the importance of the Act as an integrated whole and
the dangers which are inherent in piece-meal incorporation without regard for the meaning of the language.' e The problem of
child-snatching is a major one and is presently at the head of the
list of problem areas for state legislatures. With effective pressure
from the public, the legislators can be persuaded to forgo individual "tailoring" of the Act and join in an effort to have the Act
applied consistently by all jurisdictions.
Another weakness of the Act is that it relies too much on judicial discretion. 87 A number of the rules can be interpreted in various ways. The use of the "significant connection" doctrine and the
emergency doctrine can differ depending on whether the court follows the parens patriae idea or is willing to have confidence in the
ability of a sister state to protect the child. The doctrines of "clean
hands" and forum non conveniens allow great discretion.8" As a
result, courts fail to exercise jurisdiction when they should and exercise it when they should not. Courts are also afforded wide discretion in determining whether other jurisdictions have complied
with the UCCJA thereby obligating application of full faith and
credit to the decree. 80 A possible solution to the problem of unbridled discretion is to encourage trial judges to change their attitudes. While the tendency is to protect the "local" person, the major concern of the judges should be to carry out the intent of the
UCCJA even if it means closing the door to a local parent. The
welfare of the child should be paramount and a judge's decision to
accept jurisdiction should reflect this concern. If it would be in the
child's best interest for another state to determine custody, the
court should refuse jurisdiction even if it technically has the power
to exercise jurisdiction.
An additional weakness is the lack of force behind the Act.
While interstate cooperation is desirable, it is not mandatory and
one court cannot force its decree on another state if the subsequent court refuses to enforce it. 9" There are no specific enforcement provisions or sanctions in the Act. The sanctions are left
within the judges' discretion. 91 Without uniform sanctions, parents
86. Id.
87. Katz, supra note 41, at 31.

88. Id.
89. Id. at 32.

90. Id.
91. Id.
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will still relocate in an area where the punishment is the slightest
and the deterrent effect is lessened. One solution to this problem
would be for state legislatures to adopt kidnapping statutes which
would make it a felony in any state to transport a child out of state
in violation of a custody order. If kidnapping were deemed a felony, the abducting parent would be subject to extradition to the
state from which the parent fled. Such statutes would work with
the UCCJA and eliminate the incentive to relocate in a second
92
state in the hope of a lighter sanction.
The UCCJA is of no value if the child is snatched and the
parent never starts modification proceedings. Those parents who
choose to remain underground are beyond the reach of the Act.' 3
This weakness is a major one because children forced to live underground with a new identity and lacking a stable environment
are the ones most affected psychologically by child-snatching. The
use of federal and state parent locator services is a possible solution for the custodial parent." These services will help the parentvictim who cannot afford to hire a private detective to locate the
child.
The risk of punitive modification decrees being issued by the
original court and enforced automatically in the other states is another problem.' 5 There is no guarantee that the modification decree is being made for the good of the child instead of the "local"
parent. The decree should not be used to punish or coerce the
other parent. A number of modification decrees are made to discipline the parent for failure to comply with a court order. Such action only adds incentive to kidnap the child and disappear. The
amount of discretion allowed the original court for modification
must be strictly limited as must be the power of any other state.
The ability to modify must be used sparingly. Section fourteen of
the UCCJA could be amended to provide rules on the exercise of
modification jurisdiction thereby restricting judicial discretion for
modification by the original court." It should be made clear that
the original court, like any other court, can only make changes if
for the good of the child. Any modification should be supported by
evidence that it is for the child's best interest and not to vindicate
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Katz, supra note 14, at 113.
Foster and Freed, supra note 4, at 36.
Id. at 37.
Sampson, supra note 8, at 31.
Id.
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the court. As one court has already said, "courts can well survive
this offense to their dignity; the children should not, however, suf97
fer further offense to their welfare.1

A remaining problem is the lack of cooperation among the
states.98 Judges have gone to extremes to find jurisdiction in order
to reward a local child-snatcher. Until the judges learn to think,
according to the principles of the UCCJA, the lack of cooperation
among the states will be a recurring problem.
A big weakness of the Act is that it has not been adopted by
all the states. So long as any "haven" states exist it will be difficult
to surmount the incentive to child-snatch.99 The only way the
UCCJA will work effectively is for all states to join in the effort to
prevent child-snatchers using the courts to violate valid custody
decrees issued by other states. Campaigns should be instituted in
each of the remaining states to encourage the adoption of the
UCCJA in those states.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The UCCJA is an effort to remedy the tragedy that exists in
child custody disputes today. Efforts are being made to surround
the child of a broken home with a sense of continuity, of family
and a need to belong because a child can handle anything better
than instability.' °° The Act is designed to give as much assurance
as possible that the first custody determination will be an informed
one made by the court with the closest relationship with the child
and his family and that the decision will be enforced by other
states without relitigation. To be successful, the Act requires new
judicial approaches and trans-state thinking. 101 North Carolina has
joined the ranks of the states which have adopted the UCCJA, and
thus far the courts have dealt successfully with the application of
the Act to child custody disputes, carrying out the intent and purpose of the Act. Efforts must be made to insure the continued application of the principles of the UCCJA in custody disputes in
North Carolina. Until some peaceful non-judicial procedure is developed to resolve custody disputes, it remains the job of the
97. Application of Lang, 9 App. Div. 2d 401, 193 N.Y.S.2d 763, 771 (1959).
98. Sampson, supra note 8, at 30.
99. S. KATZ, supra note 41, at 32.
100. Proceeding of Special Committee on Uniform Divorce and Marriage
Act, National Conference of Comm. on Uniform St. Laws, § 98 (Dec. 15-16, 1964).
101. Bodenheimer, supra note 10, at 1244.
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courts "to hold the line against the tragedies that result from shiftto state in search of a bigger or better
ing children from state
1 02
'share' of the child.

Sharon K. Allen

102. Bodenheimer, supra note 44, at 227.
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